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INTRODUCTION 
 
John Holdren, President Obama’s Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, has described humankind’s current approach to climate change like 
this: ‘we’re driving in a car with bad brakes in a fog and heading for a cliff. We know for 
sure now that the cliff is out there, we just don’t know exactly where it is. Prudence 
would suggest that we should start putting on the brakes’ (quoted by Friedman 2009, 
160). Holdren does not appeal to a precautionary principle of seeking to avoid or cover 
against an unlikely but possible major danger. The coming troubles are now relatively 
certain if we continue on the present course. In the words of for example UNESCO’s 
advisory World Commission on the Ethics of Science and Technology: ‘What is already 
unequivocally known about global climate change is that it poses a risk of ethically 
unacceptable harm which is uncertain only in terms of magnitude and timing.’ (COMEST 
2010, 29).
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  If we can speak of humankind in the way that we do of an individual, then 
the appeal is rather to a principle of non-psychosis, of avoiding self-wounding. However, 
in the climate change situation those who are driving might not be those who will go over 
the cliff; most of the victims and especially most of the worst affected will be, as it were, 
low-income persons who are riding insecurely on the bumpers and the car roof, and 
especially their children and grandchildren.  
The World Commission itself used another analogy that goes beyond the 
precautionary principle, to reflect that the world faces not just a small chance of distant 
disasters but imminent certain and serious damage, at least for many people, if we do not 
change course.  
[While] it would not be reasonable to expect someone who cannot swim to rescue a child 
drowning in the heavy swells of a rough sea…we would find it ethically reprehensible if 
a well-trained lifeguard, who knows how to brave such conditions and has the equipment 
to do so, refused to come to the rescue and merely stood by as the child drowns. …We 
would find it equally reprehensible if the lifeguard did not act on the grounds that (a) he 
was waiting for better equipment to arrive, (b) he would compromise his economic 
position by being late for his night job, (c) he would not take action unless someone else 
assisted him, or (d) he was awaiting specific instructions to intervene. (COMEST 2010, 
33) 
Massive human rights violations are now in the pipeline, as product of ongoing 
anthropogenic climate change which will destroy many people’s livelihoods, and from its 
(non-)treatment and understatement both in mainstream politics and mainstream policy 
analysis such as even the World Bank’s World Development Report 2010 and the Stern 
Review (Stern 2007; IPCC 2007; Hansen 2011). The well-to-do of the world—who have 
generated the problem—act like the lifeguard, in other words they largely fail to act, 
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 Is the danger real? Brown (2012) cites two recent surveys of expert opinion. First: 
‘a 2009 study--published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States--polled 1,372 climate researchers and resulted in the following two conclusions.  (i) 97-98% 
of the climate researchers most actively publishing in the field support the tenets of ACC 
(Anthropogenic Climate Change) outlined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
(ii) The relative climate expertise and scientific prominence of the researchers unconvinced of 
ACC are substantially below that of the convinced researchers. (Anderegg et. al 2010)’.  
Second, he cites an even larger poll from 2009 which gave very similar results (reported in Doran and 
Zimmerman 2009). See also 18 statements from national scientific associations, assembled at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/ssi/climate-change/scientific-consensus-on.html. 
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citing all the reasons above and others. Often the lifeguard is preoccupied with his 
PlayStation. 
Somewhat better than Holdren’s analogy, the situation we face might be 
compared to that of a fleet of supertankers, on autopilot, heading towards a waterfall. The 
declared strengths of the capitalist market economy—that it has no need for a central 
authority and no need for good will in order to achieve good results, thanks to its ability 
to constructively mobilize everyone’s energies—may become dangers when dealing with 
a different challenge than how to expand production. When the market economy’s 
categories exclude vital factors they can lead to a style of: ‘Approaching Hazard – Full 
Steam Ahead!’. Similarly, the virtues of the dispersion of authority in a world of nation-
states—that each country can use its local knowledge, traditions and values, for prompt, 
relevant and locally acceptable management of its own affairs—can become dangers 
when dealing with webs of interconnection that drastically transcend national boundaries, 
such as the linkages in the earth’s climate system.  
In this situation we cannot expect a rapidly negotiated or commanded 
reorientation. We first require ethical and policy languages that can help to motivate and 
coordinate diverse efforts worldwide. We need a wake-up call, an alarm bell and 
mobilizer of concern. Human rights philosophy offers such a language, and is well-suited 
in many respects – it is familiar, forceful, and universally understood. It can convey the 
wrongness of harming others, which is central in this case, where consumers and 
producers of greenhouse gases bring damage to others worldwide. Its cosmopolitanism, 
the concern with all people everywhere, makes it adequate to the reality in which 
individuals and agents around the world, not only states as blocs, affect other people 
around the world. A human rights formulation such as Henry Shue’s language of basic 
rights also conveys the priority to respect basic needs fulfilment for all. Its forcefulness 
makes it an appropriate stage-setting language; and its universal comprehensibility allows 
it to serve as a medium of cross-group and cross-national communication and 
collaboration.  
But suppose, further, that the waterfalls span only part of the river and that some 
oiltankers think their sailing path is favourable, so that it will not be they that plunge over 
the falls. In some countries and some important social echelons a perception rules that 
‘we’ will be safe, even if others perish. True, ‘even a 2 degree rise in average 
temperatures will have catastrophic effects for populations living on small islands, large 
river deltas, or other low-lying areas’ (COMEST 2010, 36). But these are people whom 
we can, by various devices, avoid thinking about.  
Suppose too that various of the tankers imagine that through rapid technological 
innovation they will transform into tanker-airplanes that will be able to fly before arrival 
at the falls. Prevalent in the contemporary world is a vision of endless economic growth 
based on a magic of the market and a technological wizardry that together will save us 
from all evil.  
Human rights philosophy in defence of the likely victims of climate change must 
somehow help counteract these three major mirages or temptations: first, the warm nest 
of national identity conceived in such a way that we see ourselves as separate from, even 
immune to, the misfortunes that may beset much of the rest of the world, and such that if 
‘we’ expect to be safe, we rest indifferent to the fate of others; second, the dream of 
growth, economic and technological, that will enable us—whether defined as particular 
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national tankers or particular affluent groups and persons—to soar upwards and avoid the 
waterfall; and, third, our ability to screen out unpalatable information or questions, such 
as about the fate of ‘marginal’ groups, those in the islands, deltas and other physically or 
socially exposed locations. 
Unlike in the instructive and inspiring case of the campaigns against slavery and 
the slave trade, the convoy must brake and change course not through a century-long 
struggle, but by radical action within the next two decades, climate scientists warn us. 
The campaign in Britain against the slave trade in the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, an 
era of great public championing of philosophies of liberty, still took over fifty years to 
achieve a change in legislation; perhaps not surprisingly when confronting a practice 
which had thrived for centuries. Many more decades were required to implement the 
legislation, move against slavery itself, and act not only in Britain but around the world 
(Crawford 2002). 
Is traditional human rights discourse strong enough for mobilizing active goodwill 
and cooperation of the scale now required? Is it a sufficient framework, given its own 
individualistic and legalistic character (Gasper 2007, 2009a, 2012)? Canada’s recent 
walkout from the Kyoto Protocol, for example, reflects not an outright rejection of ideas 
of human rights, but in effect a rejection or lack of a picture of shared human fate and 
interconnectedness on Planet Earth. The warm nest, the focus of loyalty, is the nation. 
Rights of each person are considered as rights within and duties of the nation. Others 
outside my nation implicitly fall outside the moral community. To paraphrase the British 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain speaking in September 1938: ´How horrible, 
fantastic, incredible it is that we should be talking about reducing consumption and 
changing our lifestyle because of supposed problems in a far-away and future country 
populated by people of whom we know nothing.’3 
The equation of the subject of human rights with the present-day citizen within 
the nation-state has become (even more) obsolescent in our intensively causally 
interconnected globe. Correspondingly, human rights thinking requires re-articulation 
within a human security perspective, that considers the human species, its planetary 
habitat, its vulnerabilities and fears and causal, emotional and moral interconnections, in 
a perspective of its evolution and unguaranteed perpetuation over generations and 
millennia (CHS 2003; Brauch 2007; Picciotto 2007; UNESCO 2008). To respond to the 
challenges of global climate change, traditional human rights formulations remain 
appropriate goals but are not a sufficient set of instruments. 
The paper looks first at the temptations and mirages: the warm nest of the nation, 
the dream of problem-transcending growth, and the visionless vision of overlooking the 
weak, ignoring the marginal, and excluding the Other; and second at the human rights 
agenda’s vital contributions, but why it is insufficient, and at the value-added by 
formulating and pursuing human rights within a vision of shared human security. 
 
                                                 
3
 ‘How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here 
because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing’, said Chamberlain 
in reference to the dispute between Czechoslovakia and Nazi Germany 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Chamberlain; consulted 1 June 2012). 
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DIAGNOSIS – I: THE WARM NEST OF THE NATION 
 
In December 2011 the Canadian government walked out of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
under which it had agreed to reduce by 2012 its greenhouse gas emissions by 6% 
compared to 1990 levels. Its emissions had instead risen by 24%. Citing the costs to each 
Canadian citizen of ‘following Kyoto’, a country that in the late 1990s had championed 
principles of Human Security in foreign policy abandoned its earlier commitment rather 
than in effect pay for its non-fulfilment by having to buy carbon credits to cover its 
excess emissions. Put differently, the costs inflicted on others, including future 
generations and people outside Canada, would be ignored and not paid for by the present-
day Canadian producers and consumers who were responsible for them. The principles 
cited by Canada in its era of human security advocacy before 2006, when it sought a 
distinctive international profile and legitimacy—principles of interconnection, mutual 
respect, responsibility for the effects of one’s actions, and contribution in light also of 
one’s response-ability—were abandoned. 
 Canada is not unique in such behavior. Saudi Arabia, a proselytizing power for a 
great universal religion, is also a shame-free obstructer of carbon controls. But Canada’s 
U-turn was particularly shocking, perhaps since expectations are higher for democratic 
states. Dani Rodrik (2011) warns us though of the tensions between nationalism, 
democracy, and economic globalization. A country may be able to uphold any two of 
these, but faces difficulty to maintain all three. Prior to full-blooded economic 
globalization, European economies could combine nationalism and democracy. The 
present-day tribulations of the European economic union suggest that its members need 
either to pool sovereignty, moving beyond nationalism except on the sports field, or to 
reduce their exposure to economic globalization.  
Canada’s example, amongst others, suggests we need to extend Rodrik’s analysis 
to include a fourth principle, even harder to combine with the forces of nationalism, 
democracy and globalized markets: environmental sustainability and the interests of 
future generations. Canada’s Kyoto walk-out was an expression of democracy, 
responding to voters’ expressed concerns, while seeking to cope with the competitive 
pressures of economic globalization; within a nationalist frame, for the voices that are 
expressed and counted are only those within the national nest. It was a rejection of 
sustainability. To pay attention to climate damage would mean paying attention to the 
interests of the present and future generations affected by Canadian emissions. Both of 
these groups are 99.6% non-Canadian. The future, too, is seen as another country; or even 
the future generation Canadians are seen—in the view from the nest but probably 
wrongly—as better served by being richer, regardless of the costs inflicted on others 
worldwide, since by being richer they can supposedly protect themselves against both 
climate change and the harmed foreigners. 
 As yet, countries like Canada do not feel much connection, moral or causal, to the 
global South. Northern fishing fleets have ignored fishing limits and exhausted fisheries 
off Southern shores, for example in Senegal and off the Cape of Good Hope, removing 
the livelihoods of local fisherpeople whose small boats cannot compete. These impacts 
are not noticed in the North, or are treated as like any market competition for resources or 
customers. In the case of climate change, the degree of mental and moral alienation is yet 
stronger: it is exacerbated, as Gardiner (2011) underlines, by the plurality of agents who 
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contribute to such effects and the wide dispersion of the effects of one’s actions in space 
and in time. The effects fall not only on people far distant in identity from the 
perpetrators, on people who are not part of ‘us’ and not objects of moral loyalty, but who 
are not even perceived or individually identifiable. There are innumerable agents and 
innumerable victims. 
 In such an impersonal alienated arena, relationships become like those of the 
global market: one is held responsible for damage only when a law protects those who 
are damaged and it can be enforced. 
The US government (and corporate) position in discussions on climate change … 
implicitly applies a market mentality …. Damage to others need not be culpable in a 
market framework, if not produced by direct assault or breach of a law. In fact the 
doctrine of competition demands that one try to inflict damage on competitors and 
indirectly on their employees and suppliers. … As with a corporation found to be 
polluting a common resource and hence indirectly damaging others, the defence may be 
offered that no one has property rights over the common resource. Therefore those who 
have broken no law and who only indirectly and unknowingly may have harmed others 
are, supposedly, non blame-able (‘blame’ originally means ‘to speak ill of’). Within a 
defensive individualistic world-view, no blame means no responsibility for redress.
 
(Gasper 2005, 17) 
The very term ‘the environment’ is indicatively inadequate, suggests Kovel 
(2007). It means that which is external – the sink into which Man dumps wastes. 
‘Ecology’ is a more adequate term, for it suggests interconnections. Ecological 
consciousness considers: nature-nature connections; human–nature connections and the 
mutual constitution of people and nature; and human–human connections and mutual 
constitution. The national nest’s status as an isolated moral universe relates to a 
perception of it as a substantially causally isolated universe, a perceived ontological 
separation from ‘the environment’, meaning in this case the other countries or parts of the 
world upon whom one rains wastes. Moral indifference reflects not only lack of 
sympathy but lack of attention, which reflects and reinforces the mental structuring of 
identity.  
  Self-concerned nationalism in the context of global public goods leads to the sorts 
of disaster explored by game-theory. The use of a national framing of issues and of 
solutions also reinforces the policy stasis on climate change because it contributes to 
inattention to high-emitters in low-income countries, which reduces the willingness of 
high-emitter countries to act. As Harris (2010) observes, the affluent classes in middle-
income and fast-growing low-income countries like China, Mexico, Brazil, India and 
Indonesia now account for a large share of global emissions, and there is no ethical case 
for not including them in a system of obligations. 
 The intensity of resistance to climate change related obligations in the USA in 
particular has, however, deeper causes. The exceptional amount of climate change denial, 
for example, demands examination. One factor may be the psychological extremity of the 
implied threat to people’s present life-style and self-image. Climate change is a 
counterpart case to slavery, but without the same time available to sort it out. Appeals to 
principles of human rights may have little immediate impact. The disconnect of much of 
the general American and Canadian public from adequate reporting of the scientific 
information and from careful ethical debate of the issues arising reflects many factors in 
addition to academic involution, and seems unlikely to change quickly, given current 
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structures of power and identity and thus of allocation of attention. Basic worldviews that 
structure attention may only evolve gradually. Correspondingly, one can posit for most 
Americans and Canadians that only when they perceive global warming as being of direct 
major harm to them is rapid change in their stance probable. Perhaps corporate America’s 
world-wide interests and calculations about global interconnection will help such an 
evolution eventually. At present however, many powerful groups in the USA and Canada 
feel that they may even gain from global warming; for example, through longer growing 
seasons, navigability of the Arctic, and access to mineral wealth beneath the Arctic 
Ocean. A contribution of human security analysis is that it can widen the field of 
attention and the awareness of global interconnections by important elite groups—
corporate, military and political—in ways that could counteract insouciant and 
unenlightened forms of self-interested stance (CNA 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Moran 
2011). Damage done to others will not remain quarantined far away. 
Whereas liberals focus relatively more on issues of harm and fairness, 
conservatives concentrate more on in-group loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity, 
suggests some moral psychology research (Haidt & Graham 2007). Unless one appeals to 
conservatives’ self-interest and group-interest, one may not have much influence on 
them. Richard Schuhmann (2010) extends this line of analysis. To appeal to US 
conservatives one needs to refer to what they care about, especially implications for the 
USA, not for Bangladesh or Africa. Of particular relevance could be, first, attention to the 
increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Conservative Americans 
feel well protected against general warming or even welcome it, but are sensitive to 
Katrina type events that overwhelm normal protection even in the USA, and they can 
foresee the possible destabilizing impacts of similar events in poor countries. Second, one 
should highlight opportunities for the USA in the march to ‘the green economy’. Third, 
one may point to potential win-win paths that reduce emissions while increasing well-
being, especially as compared to the alternative of eventual crisis, and in some cases also 
offering ways out of current lose-lose ruts of a consumerist life-style (see e.g. Segal 1998 
on commuting patterns and time budgets). Fourth, some conservatives are sensitive to 
arguments about future generations and the accusation of inter-generational buck-passing. 
Conventional rates of time discount imply a drastic downgrading of the interests of one’s 
grandchildren, and of their grandchildren, and are justified only if high economic growth 
can continue indefinitely, in other words only if the natural environment sets no limits.  
Thomas Friedman of The New York Times essays all these steps in his book on 
climate change for the general US audience, Hot, Flat and Crowded. He tries to make US 
conservatives think about climate change in the way German conservatives do: as a great 
business opportunity. He too assumes that high economic growth can continue 
indefinitely.  
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DIAGNOSIS - II: THE SONG OF GROWTH  
 
Friedman, like most mainstream authors (e.g., World Bank 2009; Stern 2010) is explicitly 
committed to endlessly ongoing economic growth in rich countries, not only the project 
of economic development in presently poor countries. He emphatically believes in 
continuing economic growth as still potentially welfare-giving in a country as wealthy as 
the USA. Authors like Stern are more reticent here, but see growth as at least politically 
unavoidable. Stern declares that, to get political support for any national or international 
deals on climate, growth must be seen to go on and on. This forces his and similar 
projections of the required cuts in emissions-intensity (the volume of greenhouse gases 
[GHGs] generated per unit of national or global output) to become so ambitious: 80% 
cuts worldwide by 2050 (Stern 2010, 41), merely to not exceed a GHG level of 500 ppm 
(parts per million), far higher than most climate scientists now consider safe. Using a 
similar projection, the World Development Report 2010 yet asserts that ‘there is no 
reason to think that a low-carbon path must necessarily slow economic growth’ (World 
Bank 2009, 7) – no reason. 
One underlying factor, says Tim Jackson’s book Prosperity Without Growth, is 
the structure of our contemporary capitalist economies. Zero or negative growth is likely 
to mean more unemployment, loss of government revenue, increase of social security 
payments, budgetary crisis and possible generalized economic crisis. As on a treadmill, 
one must keep running in order not to be swept away. There are ways to redesign the 
economic structure to avoid this bind. The agitation engendered by such discussions of 
ever phasing-out growth is so great however that various authors posit in addition 
underlying political, psychological and cultural sources: there is a ‘social logic’ of 
permanent growth as well as an economic treadmill (Gasper 2009b). The past two 
generations have seen the emergence around the world of numerous individuals who 
define themselves through new purchases, and of producers who rely on ever new cycles 
of this process (Jackson 2009; Hamilton 2010). 
Friedman displays that zeal for growth. The word seems to function for him as a 
talisman of the good; he keeps repeating it. We must keep ‘innovating better ways to 
drive growth with fewer and fewer electrons’ (p.232) and ‘find a way to create wealth—
because everyone wants to live better—without creating toxic assets in the financial 
world or the natural world that [will] overwhelm us’, says Friedman (2009, 9). We must 
have more: we want it, and, by assumption, economic growth is the only way for even 
rich countries to live better. That more is always wanted suggests though the emptiness of 
much of what is already possessed. 
Friedman’s journalistic ear is attuned to more than one song. Within his book’s 
500 pages one finds frequent appeals to the can-do spirit of U.S. engineering, the magic 
of the market, and American nationalism. At a few points though he notes that ‘Without 
an ethic of conservation…the availability of abundant, clean, reliable, cheap electrons 
would turn into a license to rape our natural world’, an intensified orgy of consumerism 
(p.236); without a love of nature, money values alone will never bring conservation 
(p.370). And deeper, without our paying attention to nature, being aware and 
appreciative, none of the other policy tools will suffice (p.372). Yet he soon returns to: 
More, More, More – the goal of an ‘environment in which you, your company, and your 
community are constantly thinking about how to generate more growth, more mobility, 
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more housing, more comfort, more security, more enjoyment, and more packaging [sic] 
from the most innovative use of the cleanest electrons and fewest resources’ (p.380). The 
chant connects to his nationalism: greening is presented as ‘the best way to re-energize 
America, rebuild its self confidence and moral authority’ (p.391).  
Often, economic growth is presented as an essential part of modern identity: the 
source of hope, meaning, and self-profiling, at the level of individuals and especially of 
nations (Gasper 2009b). It becomes the token of national strength, virility and vitality, 
‘the symbol of life itself’ (Hamilton 2010, 64). ‘Growth is the name of the game’, in the 
words of former US Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, George P. Shultz 
(interview on CNN, 14.11.10). Arguably it becomes a channel for religious feeling, a 
source of ultimate orientation that cannot be questioned; ‘religious value seems now to be 
invested in the most profane object, growth of the economy, which at the individual level 
takes the form of the accumulation of material goods’ (Hamilton 2010, 33). 
This accumulation is supposedly so important that some months of foregone 
economic growth outweigh the benefits of stabilizing the climate, or so we may infer 
from the practice of certain leading economists. The 2007 IPCC report’s maximum 
estimate for the cost of reducing emissions to 450 ppm CO2-equivalent in 2050 was 5.5 
% of world GDP. ‘Most models show lower costs’ (Hamilton, 2010, 50). Of course the 
resources to be mobilized must pass through some organizations’ budgets and be ceded 
by others, and represent enormous sums, but Hamilton puts them in perspective. The 
IPCC maximum estimate is equivalent to around two years’ foregone growth, foregone in 
order to greatly reduce the chance of disaster. In the case of the Stern Review, prepared 
for the UK Government, the estimates for achieving 450 ppm and avoiding destabilizing 
the world climate equated to a bit over a year of foregone growth. This was judged to be 
too expensive. ‘It is acceptable, according to Stern, to ask people to wait an extra five 
months for their incomes to double but it is too much to ask them to wait a little more 
than a year’ extra (Hamilton, 2010, 54). Taking serious additional risks with our future 
(mainly the future of later generations), by instead going up to 550 ppm, was deemed the 
proper balance.  
The leading climate economist William Nordhaus calculated that market 
valuations imply that the economically optimal path will be ‘to set the global thermostat 
at 2.6 degrees C [warmer] for the end of this century, rising to 3.5 degrees C [warmer] by 
2200’ compared to pre-industrial levels, whereas most climate scientists think that this 
seriously risks catastrophe, notes Hamilton (2010, 61).
4
 According to Hamilton, Sterna 
and Nordhaus’s sort of economic cost-benefit approach to climate policy is part of a 
conception in which humans are seen as ‘radically separated from the world around them, 
and can therefore regard it [exclusively] as a realm that provides goods and services for 
human benefit’ (Hamilton, 2010, 54). Earth’s climate system is seen as ‘like a central 
heating system that can be smoothly adjusted to a desired temperature’ (p.62). The 
complexities and sensitivities of the climate system, including various potentially 
disastrous feedback loops, make this conception crazily inappropriate according to many 
scientists. The gulf between the approach of some leading economists and that of 
apparently the majority of climate scientists seems disturbingly wide.
 
 
                                                 
4
 Hamilton cites the survey reported in http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/climate-
scientists-its-time-for-plan-b-1221092.html 
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The World Development Report 2010 on climate change presented the Stern 
Review as on the pessimistic side, even though most of its assumptions had already 
proven too optimistic. The 2010 Report used economic cost-benefit analysis as a guide, 
and respectfully cited Nordhaus’s calculations (p.8: Box 3). It added though that these 
indicate that the extra costs of keeping warming to 2 or 2.5 degrees rather than 3 or 3.5 
degrees are relatively small, since reduced adaptation costs would largely offset the extra 
mitigation costs. ‘The results therefore suggest that the cost of precautionary mitigation 
to 550 ppm is small’ (p.8) – less than half a per cent of economic product, which is 
presented as a reasonable cost for climate insurance.  
Mentioned in just one sentence in the World Development Report’s huge 
Overview chapter are an extra three million deaths per year from malnutrition due to crop 
failures in the business-as-usual scenario that leads to more than 5 degrees warming by 
2100 (pp. 4-5). Even in the optimistic 2 degrees warming scenario: ‘Between 100 million 
and 400 million more people could be at risk of hunger. And 1 billion to 2 billion more 
people may no longer have enough water to meet their needs’ (p.5). Such impacts carry 
little weight in economic cost-benefit analysis when they occur amongst the global poor.  
 
 
DIAGNOSIS - III: CLIMATE SILENCES 
 
We should note several distinct possible areas of distortion in climate knowledge. One is 
deafness to inter-personal distribution of costs and benefits, due to the nature of the 
techniques used; as where economic cost-benefit analysis counts monetized values, 
ignores people with no money, downplays those with little money and merges the 
measures of their lives into aggregate calculations which are dominated by the results for 
people with plenty of money. Human rights principles should give a counterforce here. 
Second: manipulation of the techniques, due to temptations generated by the volumes of 
money at stake. Although important, these manipulations are not explored here, as they 
represent ‘mere’ abuse of the techniques.5 We will say more on, third, the treatment of 
uncertainties and the inter-personal distribution of associated risks, for this is central to 
how seriously or not we treat insecurity in ordinary people’s lives. Much practice reflects 
again the distorting force of money-power, this time upon the conception of what is good 
scientific procedure. All the first three areas are linked to a fourth, the restriction of the 
information collected and circulated about the lives (and deaths) of poor people. We 
should try to counteract the third and fourth distortions by a human rights approach and 
in particular by human security analysis: to make us aware of the impacts of different 
procedures on how much attention is given to basic aspects of the lives of vulnerable 
people. A human security approach looks closely at who and which values are being 
secured, and whose interests guide us in responding to risks and uncertainties. 
 
Deafness on distribution 
                                                 
5
 See e.g. the websites of the Stockholm Environment Institute and CDM Watch, on maneuvers used to 
claim funds under the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’. Some projects have, for example, deliberately 
included increased production of highly damaging emissions (e.g. HCFC-22 and HFC-23), to be able to 
then claim credits for also including components that reduce these emissions. 
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Economic cost-benefit analysis of the type practiced by Nordhaus for looking at 
climate change impacts involves a hardness of hearing to the lives of the poor and of 
future generations. If the monetary value of estimated benefits along a path, benefits 
which typically disproportionately accrue to well-off groups, outweighs the monetary 
value of estimated costs, which typically disproportionately accrue to poorly-off groups, 
then the path is approved, regardless of whether the poorly-off and disadvantaged groups 
are compensated. If they are not compensated, then just as when funding for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation is deemed supposedly too expensive, this ‘amounts to 
harming others for money’ (Garvey 2008, 111).6 
Such use of economic cost-benefit analysis represents extension of the technique 
beyond its realm of justifiable application. It emerged as already an extension of private 
sector business calculations into the public realm, and rested on, inter alia, two 
assumptions: that it was for comparison of relatively modest alternatives that did not 
involve dramatic transformations that sacrifice some people’s lives for gain by already 
well-off others; and that those who lose from one project will gain from the next, not that 
some people, notably those with little purchasing power, will be systematically and 
consistently disadvantaged while others, notably those with ample purchasing power, are 
consistently advantaged. 
 Here we were talking about distributions of purchasing power and of project 
benefits and costs; for example, about which people get displaced from their home or get 
a high-pollution facility constructed close by. We are interested also in other types of 
distribution: the distributions of weather variations, in a given year and over the years; 
the distribution of the associated stresses, over different social groups; and the 
distribution of scientific and policy attention to these stresses on different groups, where 
unfortunately the inequalities of purchasing power and associated political power can 
influence the degree of notice and weight given to the stresses. For example, when risks 
are treated as calculable and their impacts as monetizable, then in assessments made at an 
aggregate level the damage done to very low-income people—even loss of their life—
becomes of little import and is readily outweighed by other elements in the economic 
assessment. 
The 2010 World Development Report offered a comforting estimate of the 
economic impact of prospective climate change, in global aggregate terms: ‘a global 
average GDP loss of about 1 percent’ (p.5), if warming is limited to 2 degrees C, the 
long-discussed maximum ‘safe’ rise that is now very likely to be exceeded. Besides the 
likely overoptimism of such an estimate, things look different when seen from Africa and 
with reference to the jeopardized livelihoods of many low-income people and to the 
knock-on effects. ‘Warming of 2°C could result in a 4 to 5 percent permanent reduction 
in annual income per capita in Africa and South Asia’ (World Bank 2010, 5). Restricting 
global average warming to 2 degrees C would still mean temperature rises of 4 degrees C 
in many inland parts of Africa, beyond the limits of temperature tolerance for many of the 
crops, even in an average year. In addition, the periodic exceptional years, and extreme 
periods within almost any year, will become more frequent and more damaging. Groups 
at the Durban COP-17 summit in 2011 protested that Africa-is-Roasting and You-Are-
                                                 
6
 Some critics of expenditures on climate change mitigation argue that spending on health care offers better 
returns. But often they campaign not for more health spending but for more consumer sovereignty, in other 
words allocation as determined by purchasing power. 
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Cooking-Africa. Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others have spoken repeatedly in recent 
years of a quiet genocide against the African poor; and warned that ‘as climate change 
destroys livelihoods, displaces people, and undermines entire social and economic 
systems, no country—however rich or powerful—will be immune to the consequences.’ 
(Tutu, in UNDP 2007, 166). 
 
Deafness on extreme events and extreme responses 
Such climate stresses could take some societies outside their bounds of adaptive 
capacity, as is suggested already by experiences in parts of inland Africa such as Darfur 
in Sudan. Using a range of sets of assumptions, given the uncertainties, Devitt and Tol 
(2012) formally model a set of scenarios for Sub-Saharan Africa that explore some likely 
impacts left out even by IPCC models: how climate change increases chances of conflict, 
which reduces economic growth, which further increases chances of conflict and reduces 
ability to adapt to climate change, which further reduce economic growth; and so on. 
Whereas most of Sub-Saharan Africa presently has rapid growth, some countries are 
shown to be in serious danger of becoming trapped in poverty and conflict. 
 Behind the bland aggregations, generalizations and exclusions in economic 
calculations such as those by Nordhaus and the World Bank, reality is more complex. We 
must think about climate variability and extreme weather events, not only averages, as 
the energy stored in the global climate system increases and as some weather patterns 
become less stable (IPCC 2012). A human security perspective helps us to think about 
the impacts on vulnerable persons’ lives, and to see that even vulnerable people have 
powers to respond that will affect globally interconnected economic and political 
systems. People in low-income countries are already far more likely to be hit by 
environmental disasters—violent storms, flash floods, droughts—than those in rich 
countries. Poor people in all countries are proportionately more exposed, for they live in 
the less sheltered and secure locations, and have fewer resources with which to protect 
themselves or recover. 
 Some people will be smashed by the intersection of multiple forces and trends, 
including both gradual decline and extreme events. When Hurricane Katrina struck New 
Orleans the victims were especially Afro-Americans, poorer people (since they lived in 
the riskier locations), people over sixty (this group suffered more than 60% of the 1800 
deaths), and notably persons who were all of these. Human security analyses look at the 
vulnerabilities of particular groups in their particular situations and localities, produced 
by these intersections of diverse factors. Leichenko and O’Brien (2008) show how the 
groups who are most threatened by environmental changes are often the groups who are 
also left most exposed by economic changes. They have fewer resources, of all types, to 
use in protection and recovery and are thus more damaged than other groups by the same 
exposure and by their actual exposure. Holistic analyses of specific people’s lives reveals 
these combinations of factors and their interactions (O’Brien et al. 2010.) 
 Some people who are harmed will react, as highlighted by recent work in conflict 
studies (e.g.: Campbell et al. 2007; Dyer 2010). When normative bottom-lines are felt to 
have been violated, results can be similar to when a natural threshold is breached: 
eruption or collapse. One region-by-region world review concludes: ‘On the basis of the 
evidence presented here, it is clear that the most significant consequences of climate 
change during the next few decades are likely to arise from, or be substantially amplified 
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by, human responses to natural phenomena whose immediate effects may appear to be 
relatively modest’ (Moran 2011, 8). 
 
The ‘risk’ of not being precise; versus the question of precisely whose risks? 
‘Risk’ can refer to different things: to calculable variability, which fits nicely into 
optimizing calculations, or to undesirable effects, which may fall mostly on the weak and 
hence are too often ignored. Why do even IPCC models leave out what are likely to be 
‘the most significant consequences of climate change’? Partly because the human 
responses are less closely predictable than for example the responses of glaciers to 
increased temperatures. Partly because the modellers consequently feel exposed when 
presenting estimates about occurrences that, while potentially considerably greater in 
terms of human significance, are harder to predict precisely. Further, the potential 
occurrences have huge political significance, for they have implications for the ascribed 
wisdom and legitimacy of behavior of many current powerholders. Better then, many 
analysts have felt, to remain quiet about potential impacts on people who lack political 
weight, rather than rouse the ire of major powerholders and their supporters, who are 
already incensed by even the estimates of confidently predictable physical implications of 
global warming.  
 A similar socio-logic applies in estimating those physical implications. Since the 
IPCC works by consensus, its conclusions have a conservative bias: they articulate the 
overwhelmingly demonstrable implications of corroborated quantified models, not also 
the further, more dramatic but less certain, possible implications of several other major 
trends. In general, the IPCC, like the rest of the mainstream of climate studies, has not 
paid much attention to the tails of distributions: the extreme scenarios that seem less 
likely but would be far more radical, especially for low-income people in exposed 
locations.  Overlapping with this, the IPCC has given little emphasis, including in its 
2007 Report, to cases where our knowledge of the exact parameters is shaky. A major 
example concerns melting of the polar ice-sheets. Part of the difficulty lies in estimating 
possible ‘tipping point’ behavior, such as when and how fast would ice-sheet melt 
accelerate if melting begins to reduce the power of the ice-caps to reflect back solar 
radiation; and similarly for when a positive feedback is triggered between warming and 
the release of methane from Arctic permafrost. But: ‘Tipping points are usually not 
included in predictive models because of the difficulties of gauging the degree of 
nonlinearity of the processes involved and locating the exact position of the tipping 
points’ (van Renswoude et al. 2012). ‘The risk of climate feedbacks is generally not 
included’ (Working Group III Report, IPCC 2007, 173). 
Besides an epistemic convention—that we don’t know enough yet to highlight 
this issue, though its implications could dwarf those about which we can as yet be 
precise—has lain also a tactical decision: to avoid a topic so sensitive that it could risk 
disruption of the discussion and in some places even risk loss of funding (Schneider 
2009). Yet zero ice-sheet melt plus zero feedbacks is the least likely case. A fantasy case 
may become taken as the base-case; precise myths are preferred. Only very gradually 
have we begun ‘to move toward recognizing the dangers of uncertainties in the so-called 
“fat tails” of the probability distributions of damages … and correspondingly [to] begin 
to endorse aggressive action as a reasonably priced insurance policy against potential 
disasters.’ (Cline 2007, 86). 
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Why is this essential move so gradual and so belated? Donald Brown remarks 
how natural scientists are rarely taught the rationale of their tests and conventions, for 
example when to require a 95% confidence level. McCloskey has long pointed out the 
excessive and often misplaced attention given by economists too to statistical 
significance rather than socio-economic significance (e.g. McCloskey & Ziliak 1996). To 
demand 95% confidence of a scenario of future large-scale disaster which can be averted 
by, in relative terms, modest measures is not sensible. Arguably, this happens partly 
because the risks of harm (as opposed to the risks of imprecision) are frequently 
disproportionately borne by outsider groups, those who are politically and/or 
economically marginal. The implicit principle followed is: ‘greatest loads for the weakest 
shoulders’. The ignored extremes of the distributions, and the other silences we have 
noted, typically reflect the ignored status of the moneyless and powerless.  
Human security analysis centres on bringing out the ramifications and human 
significance of such risks and uncertainties. O’Brien et al. (2010) suggest that the debate 
on global environmental change has been overly dominated by natural science questions 
and not sufficiently framed in terms of human significance. The accumulating natural 
science knowledge often generates more questions not less, and these monopolize 
attention. We need to think also about which people face known dangers and which ones 
face the nastier sides of the inevitable uncertainties. 
 
 
RESPONSES  
 
I: Countering the silences with a human rights agenda 
  ‘Human survival and world ethics go hand in hand; it is unlikely that we can have 
the former without the latter’ argues Harris (2010, 193). Human rights ethics is the most 
known, institutionalized and vivid form of world ethics. It provides a universal language 
with which to mobilize against exclusionary, marginalising, silencing languages of some 
systems of power. The Overview of the 2007/8 Human Development Report on climate 
change thus included strong and repeated messages on ‘social justice and respect of 
human rights’ (p.13). It used the term ‘human rights’ as many as eleven times. In 
contrast, the Overview of the 2010 World Development Report on climate change, almost 
identical in length to the HDR Overview, made no use whatsoever of ‘human rights’, 
whereas it employed the technocratic term ‘climate-smart’ nine times. Such is the 
frequency nowadays of human rights language that a case of its complete absence 
testifies to fear of its forcefulness. 
What is its power? First, it conveys that where fundamental harm is being caused 
by human action, duties arise to protect, prevent, desist and compensate. The moral 
implication is not for merely a superogatory, optional beneficence. Harmers have an 
obligation to not participate in rights violations, to desist and do their fair share to 
compensate, regardless of whether others are also doing their share; in the same way that, 
if others are robbing someone who cannot resist, one should decline to participate, plus 
seek to protect. Currently though, such robbery is being committed against future 
generations and against already born babies and children who will be alive in the late 21
st
 
century.  
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 Second, human rights is a cosmopolitan doctrine that takes ethics discussions out 
of the insular warm nest of the nation. Instead of focusing on national units, and diverting 
us into endless disputes over the rights and blame that should accrue to particular nations, 
it leads us to focus on the violations of basic rights inflicted on many poor persons and to 
ask how to prevent this (cf. O’Brien et al. 2010). If nations enter climate change 
negotiations only on the basis of self-interest, little will emerge; negotiations must be 
conducted also in terms of ethical principle. The attention to unjustifiable harm to 
individuals provides some of the moral force needed to transcend the motivation to free-
ride, something which a state-focused discussion fails to do (Harris 2010, 70-1). 
 Third, the focus on individuals helps to address the inadequate attention that a 
framing in terms of national units gives to: the responsibilities of rich persons and rich 
agencies, not only rich states; the responsibilities also of the rich in the global South; and 
the difficulties of poor persons in the global North (Harris 2010; Leichenko and O’Brien 
2008). Harris notes how these ethical inadequacies of a national framing undermine its 
motivational force; if rich consumers and polluters in the South too are not included in 
the moral and policy calculus around climate change the proposals will never achieve 
sufficient support in the North. Thus: ‘cosmopolitanism is more realistic than 
communitarian state-centred approaches to solving global problems. Because 
cosmopolitanism is [focused on] persons, it reveals the true locus of pollution causing 
climate change and the profound consequences of this pollution for billions of people’ 
(Harris 2010, 159). It points to duties for many agents in both rich and poor countries, not 
only for states in rich countries, and can thus be more effective; also because 
identification of duty-bearers amongst affluent persons and rich organizations in poor 
countries renders it fairer and more acceptable to rich countries too. Harris (2010, 160) 
suggests that: ‘States, rather than being the sole practical bearers or objects of 
cosmopolitan duties and rights, should instead be viewed more explicitly as facilitators of 
individual rights and duties’. States should find ways to steer and assist rich individuals 
and agents to do their duty with respect to poor persons; for example through appropriate 
taxes on climate-damaging luxury activities like air travel. 
 
II: Insufficiency of a classic human rights formulation; arguments for global insurance 
arrangements 
Some weaknesses in human rights based approaches concern insufficient conversion of 
human rights principles and standards into tools of policy analysis, or choice of 
inappropriate tools. As we saw, the 2007-8 Human Development Report differed 
radically from the 2010 World Development Report in its human rights-oriented 
language of diagnosis and critique. But it differed much less when it turned to policy 
design to mitigate and counter climate change (Gasper et al. 2011). It relied still on the 
conventional perspective of economic efficiency, which weights the desires of people in 
proportion to their purchasing power. It did this out of a feeling of urgent need to present 
a policy package, which thus inevitably reflected the existing training and networks of its 
predominantly economist staff including the belief that nice outcomes can be achieved 
largely through similar market means as contributed to the problem; and out of a wish to 
maintain acceptance and respectability in relation to some powerful stakeholders. The 
weakness here is not inherent to a human rights approach; in principle, necessary 
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additional policy tools could be identified, though some might require longer R&D 
gestation periods. 
 Some other possible limitations appear more deep-rooted, and call for innovation 
and partnerships to enrich a human rights approach. Some concern the typical legalism of 
such an approach and its degree of applicability for the climate change issue. Others 
concern whether the human rights perspective sufficiently counteracts the predominant 
frames of the warm nest of the nation and the song of growth, and thus how strongly it 
counteracts the attention deficits, the structured silences, in mainstream discussion. 
 First, legalism. This is a strength of a human rights approach: it seeks to make 
basic rights enforceable. But a strategy of legal enforcement has dangers too: the huge 
costs and slow pace of seeking justice via the legal system; possible shrinking of attention 
to within national boundaries insofar as the legal systems are national; demobilization of 
popular movements if there is reliance purely on the legal system; and a consequent easy 
buying-off of campaigns that lack a broad mass-base (like the case brought in 2009 to the 
UN High Commission for Human Rights by the Republic of Maldives regarding damage 
to it caused by global warming). 
 Second, a focus on tort law, seeking to demonstrate exact damage done by party 
X to party Y, faces many difficulties. Victims of displacement through climate change 
have no legal protection since the causation is so indirect and complex. Strict liability for 
the damage caused to others by high-emitters, including in the period before global 
climate change and its impacts were well established, is arguably ethically appropriate, 
since the emitters have benefited from what brought harm to others, people who are much 
poorer than them; but it appears operationally unworkable, since it is too difficult to 
specify the harms (and the benefits) and too onerous to pursue all the lawsuits (Penz 
2010, 166-7).  
 Penz, Drydyk and Bose (2011) have constructed a complex ethics of displacement 
in relationship to investment projects. It asks whether a particular displacement is for 
good development or mal-development, as judged in terms of a set of principles which 
have become accepted in the international system over the past two generations, 
including: promotion of well-being and respect for equity, empowerment, and 
sustainability. And it highlights, refines and applies to these investment projects the 
principles of rights to: receive good reasons; cost-sharing (not victimization of particular 
groups through enforcing disproportionate costs on them); benefit-sharing; and 
participation (Drydyk 2012). Penz et al. think creatively about forms of compensation, 
which do not only have to be direct per person as in workmen’s compensation, but can 
often more feasibly occur via policies to help a locality, as in support for adaptation, and 
also via general measures of empowerment.
7
  
All this is harder to apply to climate change than to construction of dams or 
mines. Penz therefore takes a further step. To ‘improve the chances that justifiable 
responsibilities are actually met, and partly to deal with certain difficulties in the 
justification and realisation of compensation responsibilities, I add the category of 
“insurance responsibilities”. These refer to responsibilities to set up and participate in a 
global insurance scheme that meets the costs of climate change adaptation.’ (Penz 2010, 
                                                 
7
 ‘Recognizing the centrality of empowerment will enable climate ethics to interact more significantly with 
human security approaches, in which discussion of empowerment has been more prominent’ (Drydyk 
2012: 20). 
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158).  We saw already from Cline the relevance of insurance arrangements to prepare for 
and share the risks of climate-related disasters, and, from the World Bank, their definite 
affordability. Penz’s work: 
explores various articulations of responsibilities [relevant to climate change], ranging from 
free movement responsibilities that require states to open their borders, to poverty alleviation 
responsibilities that require richer states to participate in significant global redistribution, to 
compensation responsibilities that require greenhouse gas emitting states to accept 
responsibility for harm done and to provide compensation, and finally to insurance 
responsibilities that require states to develop and participate in a global insurance scheme that 
pays compensation, while collecting premiums in accordance with each state's greenhouse 
gas emissions. The last of these is recommended as the most satisfactory formulation of 
international ethical responsibilities to those coerced or harmed by climate change, providing 
compensation for adaptation, whether by migration or in situ adaptation …  (Penz 2010, 151) 
This offers an operationalizable approach, that adapts the model of workplace insurance. 
The insurance rationale covers preventive expenditures too—paying for climate-proofing, 
not only for hospitalization after heat-stroke. 
Penz proceeds to specify ‘do your fair share’ principles for initial levies to set-up 
the insurance fund. He talks in terms of the contributions of states, not persons. We have 
seen that such a formulation has ethical flaws; but Penz’s ethical logic runs in terms of 
the rights and duties of persons, for which he then seeks a practicable first 
operationalization. He moves beyond a conventional tort-law courts-centred treatment, to 
a global system of collective social security, as befits our global interconnectedness. 
Second-stage refinements (such as levies from air travel and financial speculation taxes) 
are welcome but can follow later. 
 Third, fulfilling this agenda requires a strong motivational basis. The traditional 
human rights perspective of the rights of the individual may not be enough. Not only are 
there relevant ethical principles besides human rights, such as principles of utility and due 
care (COMEST 2010), but a human rights approach in isolation does not fully counter the 
perspective on nations that supports feelings of separation and lack of connection to ‘the 
rest of the world’; nor does it address the song of growth, the myth that everything can be 
solved by more economic growth through which we will escape the implications of 
ecological fragility and a finite globe. Rather than having an ontology of 
interconnectedness, some versions of rights thinking are ruggedly individualist and stress 
dignity alone. Besides sensitivity to dignity, we need awareness of human vulnerability 
and connectedness. A framework of shared human security provides the additional basis 
of perceptions and commitment required for both enlightened self-interest and solidarity, 
and thus for the sort of global insurance arrangements that Penz proposes.  
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CONCLUSION: COMBINING HUMAN RIGHTS WITH A HUMAN SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
I have argued that we require ethical and policy languages that are widely 
recognizable and that can motivate and mobilize worldwide – a set of roles that human 
rights language plays well. It makes clear that robbery is occurring against already born 
children and future generations. But I argued further that, for response to the challenge of 
climate change, human rights language while necessary is not sufficient. We need to 
extend it into a bigger framework of human security thinking, which more fully conveys 
what is ‘human’—including vulnerability and mutual dependence, connection to future 
generations and dependence on a global ecology—and encourages us to consider diverse 
aspects of security and forms of insecurity and to identify ourselves as members of 
humankind as a ‘community of fate’.  
By looking at the multiple intersecting forces and events—some of them extreme 
events—that shape any person’s life, this human security perspective enriches 
understanding and also, potentially, mutual sympathy and awareness of shared 
vulnerabilities, shared interests, and shared human identity (Gasper 2009a). Attention to 
the contingencies of life, including extreme events, establishes the need for insurance – 
preemptive not only palliative. The concern for security is not a language of 
condescension; it is about ensuring that agents have the basic conditions needed to act 
and adapt independently.
8
  
 The human security framework thus supports essential bases for an effective climate 
change ethics: the feelings of, first, mutual sympathy, concern for others; second, shared 
human identity; and, third, shared fate (Gasper 2009a). Of these the third, a perception of 
interdependence and shared interests, may be particularly important. Feelings of 
sympathy partly depend on feelings of shared identity and of shared fate; and feelings of 
identity are influenced by who does one feel interdependent with and thus feel as co-
members of a community of fate. Dobson notes how awareness of interconnections in the 
global environment ‘thicken[s] the ties that bind us to “strangers”, [and] bring[s] these 
strangers “nearer” without having to rely on empathetically constructing them as 
surrogate neighbours…’ (Dobson 2006, 175-6). 
 The human security framework has grown out of a concern for individual humans as 
objects of value and hence as priority foci in thinking about what ‘security’ activity 
should try to make secure. It has grown in addition from perception of the myriad 
interconnections between people and also between threats. One can call this latter 
perception ‘joined-up thinking’, which must partner the ‘joined-up feeling’, the concern 
and sharing of felt identity, that grows out of and sustains attention to human 
vulnerability and associated basic human rights (Gasper 2007, 2010, 2012). Put more 
formally, human security thinking combines a normative ontology of the value of human 
persons, as in human rights work, and an explanatory ontology of interconnectedness. 
This provides the basis necessary for climate change ethics and public action. 
 
                                                 
8
 The Global Environmental Change and Human Security research program (1999-2010) defined human 
security as where ‘individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or [sufficiently] 
adapt to threats to their human, social and environmental rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise 
these options; and actively participate in pursuing these options’ (http://www.gechs.org/human-security). 
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